The Empire Left.

The Law Remained.

Colonial inheritance, personal freedom and the unfinished meaning of independence.

by Sezer Ali | NOV 16, 2026

THE RULES THAT REMAIN, © 2026
THE RULES THAT REMAIN, © 2026

THE RULES THAT REMAIN

An allegory of inherited power, institutional authority and the individual whose freedom remains subject to laws written in another era.

In November 2026, a court in London was asked to decide whether two men in Trinidad and Tobago could be treated as criminals for their private, consensual sexual relationship.

There was something profoundly uncomfortable about the geography of that decision.

Trinidad and Tobago had gained independence from Britain more than sixty years earlier. It had become a republic, established its own political institutions and assumed responsibility for its laws. Yet the question of whether its citizens could share an intimate relationship without the threat of criminal punishment had travelled back to the former colonial capital.

The empire had left. Its legal inheritance had proved considerably more difficult to remove.

But history rarely offers such convenient divisions between those who imposed injustice and those who inherited it.

The legislation challenged before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not simply an untouched colonial statute. It had been enacted in 1986, more than two decades after independence, when the country's own parliament introduced a new framework for sexual offences while retaining restrictions rooted in an earlier era (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2026).

That distinction matters.

Colonialism may explain where a law came from. It cannot, indefinitely, explain why an independent society chooses to keep it.

And perhaps that is the more unsettling question behind this legal victory: when does an inherited injustice stop being the responsibility of the past and become the responsibility of the present?

THE INHERITANCE THAT ENDURED

Political independence is often imagined as a decisive moment. A flag is lowered, another is raised, and a nation begins writing its own history.

But the law is rarely so willing to recognise a new beginning.

When Trinidad and Tobago gained independence from Britain in 1962, it inherited a legal system shaped by colonial assumptions about morality, sexuality and the authority of the state over private life.

Among its provisions were criminal restrictions on sexual acts between men, rooted in legislation enacted under British colonial rule.

Independence did not immediately dismantle that framework.

More revealingly, in 1986, the country's own parliament introduced a comprehensive new Sexual Offences Act. Rather than abandoning the earlier restrictions, the legislation continued to criminalise forms of consensual same-sex intimacy. In certain respects, it extended the previous law and introduced harsher penalties (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2026, paras. 26–29).

This was no longer simply a colonial government imposing its moral authority upon a population it ruled.

It was an independent state exercising its own legislative power.

At what point, then, does preserving an inherited law become an active endorsement of the values it represents?

The consequences of such legislation are not confined to the courtroom.

A criminal law does not need to be enforced every day to influence the lives of those it targets. Its existence can reinforce prejudice, encourage social exclusion and remind individuals that their private relationships remain subject to the state's disapproval.

For Jason Jones, a Trinidadian LGBTQ+ activist, those consequences were not theoretical.

Jones had experienced harassment, discrimination and violence because of his sexual orientation. He also lived with the fear that the law could be used to arrest and punish him for his private life (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2026).

He challenged the legislation, beginning a legal battle that would eventually reach Trinidad and Tobago's final appellate court.

His case exposed a contradiction that had survived decades of independence: a constitutional system recognising individual rights while retaining criminal restrictions on the intimate lives of some of its citizens.

The question was no longer simply whether the legislation belonged to another era.

It was whether its continued existence could be justified in the present.

WHEN MORALITY BECOMES LAW

Every society has moral convictions. They shape its traditions, influence its institutions and help determine what communities consider acceptable.

But there is a fundamental difference between believing that something is wrong and demanding that the state punish those who do it.

Laws criminalising same-sex intimacy have long been defended through appeals to morality, religion and social order. Such arguments often present the preservation of traditional values as a legitimate responsibility of government.

Yet whose traditions are being preserved, and at whose expense?

People are entitled to their convictions, including those that others may find restrictive or outdated. Freedom of conscience is, after all, an essential part of a democratic society.

But freedom of belief does not automatically confer the right to impose those beliefs upon the private lives of others through criminal law.

That distinction becomes especially important when the conduct being regulated involves consenting adults and causes no identifiable harm to another person.

A democratic state has legitimate reasons to regulate behaviour. Protecting individuals from violence, exploitation and coercion is among its most fundamental responsibilities. But criminalising consensual intimacy raises a different question: whether the state is protecting its citizens from harm or protecting a particular moral vision from disagreement.

The distinction is not merely philosophical.

When the law treats one form of consensual intimacy as acceptable and another as criminal, it does more than reflect prevailing social attitudes. It gives those attitudes the authority of the state.

Prejudice acquires a legal vocabulary. Disapproval becomes a potential criminal charge.

Even when rarely enforced, criminal restrictions remain a powerful statement about whose relationships the state considers legitimate and whose private lives remain open to punishment.

In November 2026, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council unanimously ruled in favour of Jones.

The judges concluded that the contested provisions of the 1986 legislation were not protected from constitutional scrutiny as existing law merely because they drew upon earlier restrictions. Nor were they reasonably justifiable in a society that properly respects individual rights and freedoms (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2026, paras. 51, 74–81).

The court recognised that intimate relationships engage the fundamental right to respect for private and family life.

Its decision therefore concerned more than the technical interpretation of a statute.

It confronted the limits of the state's authority over personal identity and intimacy.

A society does not have to agree on every moral question to recognise that disagreement alone is not sufficient grounds for criminal punishment.

Indeed, perhaps one of the most important tests of democratic freedom is whether it can protect the rights of people whose lives do not conform to the convictions of the majority.

What does independence really mean when a country inherits not only the institutions of its former rulers, but also their authority over whom its citizens are allowed to love?

THE SMALLEST PIECE, © 2026
THE SMALLEST PIECE, © 2026

INDEPENDENCE IS NOT THE SAME AS FREEDOM

There is a final irony in this story.

The court that ruled in favour of Jones sits in London, the capital of the former colonial power. Yet it was acting as Trinidad and Tobago's recognised final appellate court, within a judicial arrangement retained after independence.

The outcome was not an act of British political intervention. It was the result of a constitutional challenge pursued through the country's own legal system.

And perhaps that makes the question of responsibility even more revealing.

Laws are not historical monuments. Their continued authority depends upon political choices, institutional acceptance and the willingness of successive generations to leave certain questions unanswered.

The ruling marks an important constitutional turning point. But a judgment protecting consensual intimacy from criminal punishment does not automatically remove the prejudices that helped sustain those restrictions.

Legal recognition and social acceptance do not always advance together.

A person may cease to be treated as a criminal without immediately becoming an equal participant in the society around them. The absence of prosecution does not guarantee freedom from discrimination, hostility or exclusion.

That is why the significance of this case extends beyond the courtroom.

It asks whether independence should be understood simply as the transfer of political authority, or as an ongoing responsibility to examine how that authority is exercised.

A nation can govern itself and still reproduce the injustices of those who once governed it.

Genuine independence may therefore demand something more difficult than replacing one flag with another. It requires the willingness to question inherited assumptions, reconsider established institutions and recognise that tradition alone cannot justify the denial of another person's freedom.

The British Empire is long gone from Trinidad and Tobago.

The responsibility for what remains belongs to the present.

Because freedom is not measured only by a nation's ability to govern itself, but also by the freedom it allows its people to possess.

REFERENCES

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (2026) The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and others v Jason Jones (Trinidad and Tobago) [2026] UKPC 38. Judgment delivered 10 November. Available at: https://jcpc.uk/cases/judgments/jcpc-2025-0095 (Accessed: 11 November 2026).

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (2026) The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and others v Jason Jones (Trinidad and Tobago): Press Summary. 10 November. Available at: https://jcpc.uk/cases/press-summary/jcpc-2025-0095 (Accessed: 11 November 2026).

Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (1976) Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Chapter 1:01, particularly sections 4, 6 and 13. Relevant provisions reproduced in Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (2026), paras. 16–17.

Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (1986) Sexual Offences Act 1986, Act No. 27 of 1986, particularly sections 13 and 16. Original provisions reproduced in Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (2026), para. 14.

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THE EMPIRE LEFT. THE LAW REMAINED.

The Empire Left. The Law Remained. explores how Trinidad and Tobago’s LGBTQ+ rights ruling exposes the enduring legacy of colonial laws and the limits of independence.

Sezer Ali

11/11/20266 min read